Guiding Principles for Reconstruction Management

- Government should lead the effort to define reconstruction policy and should coordinate its implementation. These policy decisions must be properly communicated to the public.
- Best practice is to establish a reconstruction policy and an institutional response structure, including one for housing and community reconstruction, before a disaster.
- The institutional arrangements for managing reconstruction should reflect reconstruction policy. The agency put in charge should be provided with a mandate, a workable structure, and a flexible operational plan.
- The reconstruction agency, even if it is new or temporary, must work closely with existing line ministries and other public agencies to provide efficient and effective post-disaster reconstruction.
- Mechanisms are needed to coordinate the actions and funding of local, national, and international agencies involved in reconstruction and to ensure that information is shared among them.
- Funding must be allocated equitably and should stay within agreed limits. Broad controls and good monitoring of all sources minimize corruption.

Introduction

The management of the recovery and reconstruction process following a major disaster presents massive and often unprecedented challenges to any country, especially those with limited or no prior experience with such situations. Where post-disaster recovery planning that anticipates institutional requirements exists, early recovery is likely to go more smoothly. Where plans are not in place, governments may need advice on designing an appropriate organizational structure to manage reconstruction. In either case, assistance may be needed to put the reconstruction management arrangements in place and to establish an effective system of coordination among governmental and nongovernmental entities. This assistance may be provided by humanitarian agencies. See Chapter 1, Early Recovery: The Context for Housing and Community Reconstruction. Coordination is particularly important for housing and community reconstruction, since a large number of organizations are often involved.

This chapter analyzes organizational options for the management of post-disaster housing reconstruction in the context of the larger disaster management institutional framework. For a discussion of partnerships and the role of civil society, see Chapter 14, International, National, and Local Partnerships in Reconstruction.

Key Decisions

1. **National and local governments** should decide on their respective reconstruction approach before a disaster, by defining policies and designing at least the general outlines of the institutional structure of the reconstruction agency.
2. Based on the results of the initial assessment, in which local government must participate, the **lead disaster agency** and **local government** need to make specific decisions about how housing and community reconstruction will be managed.
3. **Agencies involved in reconstruction** should prioritize and decide how to incorporate the strengthening of governmental capacity into their post-disaster assistance strategies.
4. Immediately after the disaster, the **lead reconstruction agency** (in consultation with affected communities, local government, national and international nongovernmental agencies, and the private sector) must design and implement the mechanisms that will be used to coordinate the reconstruction activities of all participating entities.
5. **Local government** needs to decide on and cement the partnerships it will need to ensure reconstruction takes place at the local level in an efficient and equitable manner, beginning with its relationship with the affected community, and including cooperation with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector.

6. **Agencies involved in reconstruction** need to decide on the mechanisms they will use to guarantee a two-way flow of information with affected communities. They also need to design consistent messages that empower those communities.

Public Policies Related to Institutional Arrangements

If government has developed a proper institutional strategy for disaster management, its arrangements should be put into operation once a disaster strikes. The disaster strategy may need to be adjusted, depending on the scope and nature of the disaster, but to the extent possible, this strategy should govern. Ideally, the strategy addresses both reconstruction and response, since—as explained throughout this handbook—reconstruction begins the day of the disaster. Given the local nature of housing and community reconstruction, the institutional strategy for reconstruction should provide a central role for local government and the affected communities themselves.

More commonly, there is no predefined institutional strategy, or it covers only the initial response. In these cases, roles and responsibilities are likely to be assigned in an ad hoc manner. A risk in these situations is that responsibility is unnecessarily centralized. Where local capacity was weak pre-disaster or is greatly weakened by the disaster, centralized responsibility for reconstruction may be warranted. But in other cases, the existing framework for the assignment of responsibilities between levels of government, such as the country’s policy frameworks related to decentralization and community development, should be given great weight in formulating the institutional arrangements for planning and implementing post-disaster housing and community reconstruction.

Technical Issues

Planning for Reconstruction before a Disaster

Pre-disaster planning for post-disaster response and reconstruction is becoming more common. The institutional arrangements for response and reconstruction can be defined as part of either an emergency management plan or a broader disaster risk management plan. In developing the plan, it may be necessary to overcome differences in perspective between officials responsible for emergency management and those who would manage reconstruction. The scope of a post-disaster reconstruction policy is described in Chapter 2, Assessing Damage and Setting Reconstruction Policy.

The Need for Authority, Autonomy, and Political Support

To wield the necessary authority to get the job done right, a reconstruction agency needs both autonomy and support from the highest level of government and the political system, and broad-based support from the other agencies and communities affected by the reconstruction process. Support from the top helps minimize political interference: individual politicians or parties trying to capture resources for their own constituents who were not affected by the disaster, for instance, or contracts being intercepted for individual gain. Support from below strengthens cooperation, thus making the collective reconstruction effort more effective and equitable. Support builds when actors see that decisions are based on transparent policies and accurate data about the impact of the disaster on the surviving population.
The need for authority, autonomy, and political support applies at each level where responsibility is vested. This chapter focuses on the requirements to manage housing and community reconstruction in the context of the overall institutional requirements for reconstruction; however, these same issues apply to local governments and communities, to the extent they are delegated a critical role in reconstruction.

**Rebuilding Governmental Capacity**

A disaster may be confusing and overwhelming for government officials, especially local officials. Both national and local political leaders will want to show rapid results in response to public pressure for recovery. There may be pressure on local officials to ignore local policies (such as land use regulations) and procedures (such as building code enforcement) or to turn responsibilities over to international aid agency staff who may be “disaster veterans.”

Rebuilding governmental capacity is an essential prerequisite for physical, social, environmental, and economic reconstruction. Having a governance structure in place during reconstruction helps ensure the sustainability of the investments that have been made and policies that have been established. For local government, this may mean such practical activities as rebuilding staffing levels and recovering records damaged by the disaster. National reconstruction agencies are unlikely to have a ready-made strategy for overcoming local institutional weaknesses. International financial institutions (IFIs) and other funding sources, however, can gain great leverage by providing technical, financial, and material support to reestablish local government capacity.

**Organizational Options**

Various models have been adopted by governments for reconstruction management. Each has its own distinctive merits as well as demonstrated weaknesses.

In large-scale disasters, or where government capacities are limited, creating a new dedicated agency may be the best alternative. The experience of earthquake reconstruction in Marmara, Turkey, is an example of how having a dedicated implementation unit can streamline the recovery process for the physical reconstruction, although it may not have contributed to institution building or improved longer-term mitigation. Managing international appeals for support; arranging large credits and grants from donors and IFIs; and managing procurement, disbursement, monitoring, and evaluation also present huge challenges in the aftermath of large-scale disasters. These functions alone may require a new institutional solution.

Some well-managed recovery operations have been undertaken using existing line ministries and departments. Case studies on the National Institute for Disaster Management in Mozambique and the Housing Foundation in Iran, below, show how existing institutions can be effective managers of post-disaster reconstruction.

Not only do the structures that have been used to manage reconstruction vary greatly, they are also frequently seen to evolve over time. Models from one disaster are difficult to import directly into a new disaster context. The case study below on FORREC, the institutional model adopted after the 1999 Armenia earthquake reconstruction, and FORSUR, created after the 2007 Ica/Pisco, Peru, earthquake, demonstrates how institutional solutions may be context-specific.

Following any disaster, governments need to decide fairly quickly on the institutional arrangements for recovery and reconstruction management. The following table indicates the principal organizational options with their inherent strengths and weaknesses.¹

---

## Organizational Models for Reconstruction

### Option 1. Create new dedicated organization or task force

*(applicable in centralized or decentralized context)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly independent, focused</td>
<td>Risks relegating line ministries to the sidelines and duplicating their efforts</td>
<td>Seriously consider for large-scale disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides mechanism for resource allocation,</td>
<td>Takes time to clarify roles and responsibilities</td>
<td>Employ if government is decimated by the disaster or involved in civil conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>procurement, and staffing</td>
<td>May lack local ownership</td>
<td>“Sunset” clauses critical to avoid agency surviving beyond its mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handles complex financial arrangements with</td>
<td>Expensive; requires premises, facilities, and staff</td>
<td>The case studies on the 1985 Mexico City earthquake and the 2005 North Pakistan earthquake responses, below, show how a new entity is sometimes a very effective solution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>international donors</td>
<td>Problematic exit strategy; will probably fight to survive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplifies consultation with government</td>
<td>If re-created for each disaster, doesn’t build on experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectively addresses tasks</td>
<td>(See case study on Colombia, below)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Option 2. Create dedicated organization or task force drawn from existing line ministries

*(applicable in centralized or decentralized context)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improves coordination with existing sector</td>
<td>May lack political authority</td>
<td>When formed from existing line ministries, far more likely disaster recovery lessons will be applied to improve future disaster operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>activities and policies</td>
<td>Can weaken ministries and undermine ongoing non-disaster programs</td>
<td>The case study on the Bam earthquake reconstruction, below, illustrates the success of a task force-type organizational model.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top executive drawn from outside bureaucratic</td>
<td>Proper expertise may not exist in line ministries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ranks</td>
<td>International agencies may not finance backfilling of normal ministry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exit strategy: staff returns to previous</td>
<td>functions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government positions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Option 3. Existing governmental agencies manage recovery under national disaster plan

*(particularly applicable in decentralized context)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Places sector responsibility with sector</td>
<td>Can overburden provincial and local governments with inadequate capacity to manage large reconstruction program</td>
<td>Effective, but needs detailed pre-disaster planning, staff training, and national disaster plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expertise</td>
<td>Can overload line ministries with double agenda (reconstruction and normal programs)</td>
<td>Requires existing line ministries to be strengthened with experienced staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full local ownership</td>
<td>International agencies may not finance backfilling of normal ministry</td>
<td>Advisable option if reconstruction is manageable and local governments are strong and decentralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exit strategy: staff returns to previous</td>
<td>functions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government positions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If country is highly decentralized, sector</td>
<td></td>
<td>The case studies on the National Institute for Disaster Management in Mozambique and the Housing Foundation in Iran, below, show how existing institutions can be effective managers of post-disaster reconstruction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rehabilitation corresponds to decentralized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>functions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster risk reduction lessons carried back</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to normal operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increases probability government will apply</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disaster recovery lessons to future disaster</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>operations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The Need for Mandate, Policy, and Plan

Laying out the building blocks of a good institutional framework may be more important than suggesting institutional forms. To be effective, this framework needs several elements, specifically a mandate, a policy, and a plan that include the following elements.

Mandate. This is the official direction and support given to the reconstruction agency from a higher level of government, and should include the following elements:
- Support by appropriate legislation
- Sustained political support without interference
- Direct links to relevant line ministries
- Adequate financial, human, and material resources
- Knowledge of disaster recovery process dynamics
- Mechanisms for continual two-way consultation with affected communities
- Effective management information systems
- Administrative systems capable of managing international loans and grants
- Good governance, including mechanisms for interaction with civil society
- Credibility with surviving communities and other agencies involved in reconstruction

Policy. The reconstruction policy is the set of principles on which reconstruction planning and implementation is based (see Chapter 2, Assessing Damage and Setting Reconstruction Policy), including:
- Reconstruction aims and objectives
- Financial policies
- Rules for registration and monitoring of agencies involved in reconstruction
- Special provisions for highly vulnerable groups
- Housing assistance policies with eligibility criteria and allocation schemes
- Links among strategies to provide (or provide support for) immediate shelter, transitional housing, and full reconstruction
- Standards for agencies assisting communities regarding, among others, minimum and maximum financial and in-kind assistance and requirements for community participation, with the means for measuring and enforcing them
- Approach to address safety concerns, including, among other things, siting and land use controls, building design and technology, materials, training, enforcement procedures, and legal requirements
- Anticorruption policies

Plan. Practical arrangement for interinstitutional coordination and consistent implementation of policies, including:
- Participation plan and mechanisms for consultations with various stakeholders
- Communications strategy and plan
- Clear definition of roles and responsibilities for various entities
- Plan for allocation and delivery of financial resources
- Monitoring and evaluation plan and tools to maintain accountability to beneficiaries
- Strategy for transition between different stages of disaster recovery, especially the handoff from transitional to permanent housing programs
- Strategies for linking different sectors of recovery (in addition to housing, plans for infrastructure, livelihoods, health, and education)
- Mechanisms for ensuring coordination among agencies working in related sectors, particularly between housing and infrastructure reconstruction

Financial Planning

Implementing institutions cannot fulfill their purposes without adequate, predictable budgetary support for the entire reconstruction period. The extraordinary nature and scale of the requirements, and the likelihood that funding is coming partially from external sources, may mean that the reconstruction budgeting will be taken out of the regular budget cycle. This can provide flexibility and reduce administrative procedures, and therefore expedite recovery. But the alternate arrangements still should be transparent. These issues are discussed in Chapter 15, Mobilizing Financial Resources and Other Reconstruction Assistance.
Local Government as a Central Reconstruction Actor

Local problems and opportunities are best managed by local officials using local powers and applying local knowledge. At the same time, a balance is needed between policies that ensure quality and equity in housing reconstruction and implementation based on local reality, capacity, and culture.

The role of local government varies from one country to another with respect to the extent of the powers and resources delegated to them. In countries where extensive devolution has taken place, and local capability is strong, there is greater opportunity for management from the local level than there is in contexts where local government is little more than an arm of central government and does not have administrative and financial autonomy. Countries where there are multiple levels of government, with varying levels of authority (provinces, states, districts, communes, etc.), may face unique challenges. In many of these countries there are significant functional overlaps or gaps; this situation may be exacerbated by a disaster and make decision making cumbersome. Streamlined procedures and a very clear delineation of functions can help ensure an effective response to the demands that reconstruction places on all levels of government in these countries. It is critical to conduct an analysis of strengths and weaknesses of local governments, as well as of the risks and risk management strategies that may be employed, before defining the role of local government in reconstruction. The role of local government should be defined in the reconstruction policy.

Risks and Challenges

- Creating new institutions to manage recovery and reconstruction that duplicate or sideline the work of existing entities who are capable of doing the work.
- Creating new institutions that end up working without a clear mandate or sufficient autonomy.
- Planning reconstruction without paying attention to the need to rebuild national and local governmental capacity.
- Overcentralizing reconstruction planning and implementation.
- Government, in its weakened post-disaster state, allowing external entities to assume too much authority over management and coordination of recovery.
- Government failing to incorporate and institutionalize disaster risk reduction activities in reconstruction.
- Multiple entities, both inside and outside government, with different demands and priorities, at odds with one another, and operating independently of government’s reconstruction policy.
- Political interference in reconstruction and corruption in large contracts, including those for housing and community reconstruction.

Recommendations

1. Define reconstruction policies and institutional mechanisms before disaster strikes.
2. If the demands of the disaster go beyond government capacity, establish a dedicated organization to manage disaster recovery.
3. Wherever possible, administer reconstruction using existing ministries and/or municipal departments and their existing staff, or at a minimum, provide them a central role.
4. Equip both the lead reconstruction agency and the local agencies charged with housing reconstruction with a structure, a mandate, a policy, and a plan.
5. Make certain that central or local governments weakened by a disaster are strengthened so that they can adequately manage reconstruction.
6. Have government regulate the work of all stakeholders, verifying their capacity, establishing standards for their work, and ensuring that their interventions are consistent with national policy.
7. Set up reliable monitoring and evaluation procedures to guarantee accountability and transparency.
Case Studies
1999 Armenia Earthquake, Colombia, and 2007 Ica/Pisco Earthquake, Peru

How the Context Affects the Success of a Reconstruction Institutional Model

Given the well-known success of the reconstruction program in Colombia after the 1999 Armenia earthquake, led by the Fund for the Reconstruction and Social Development of the Coffee-Growing Region (Fondo para la Reconstrucción y Desarrollo Social del Eje Cafetero [FOREC]), and the superficial similarities between that seismic event and the August 2007 earthquake in the Ica, Chincha, and Pisco provinces of Peru, it was understandable that the president of Peru would look to Colombia for advice on how to organize reconstruction. In fact, shortly after a meeting between officials from the two countries, Peruvian President Alan García announced the creation of a fund for the affected region similar to FOREC, the Fund for the Reconstruction of the South (Fondo para la Reconstrucción del Sur [FORSUR]).

However, there were some crucial differences between the FOREC and FORSUR models that affected FORSUR’s progress. FOREC was designed in ways that made it particularly effective, and it adopted an approach to reconstruction that served to increase its influence. These aspects included (1) administrative and normative autonomy; (2) a Board of Directors composed of local and central governments and the private sector; (3) an early, in-depth assessment of damage and needs followed by a planning process that was strategic, not just focused on rebuilding what was there before (within 10 months all plans were completed and all financing was programmed); (4) adequate funding from national and international sources; (5) a relatively advanced institutional framework for decentralization that included a system for local land use planning; (6) a decentralized approach to reconstruction that depended on both existing NGOs and, to a lesser extent, on local governments (the FOREC model has occasionally been criticized for not giving local governments sufficient scope); and (7) a transitional shelter strategy that provided adequate time for reconstruction to be done properly.

In contrast, Peru’s decentralization process was not mature, and government preferred to minimize the role of NGOs and of its generally weak local governments. FORSUR reported to the president of the Council of Ministers and was considered part of government, subject to most governmental procedures for approval of projects and disbursement of resources. Its Board was large (19 members) and appointed from all sectors, although its Executive Director was from the private sector, and the public perceived that it was largely a private entity. In general, FORSUR had a limited mandate and was unprepared for the social aspects of reconstruction. Partly because a comprehensive damage and loss assessment was never carried out, the number of people affected and their needs were underestimated by FORSUR for some time after the disaster. FORSUR had decentralized offices with limited staff within seven months after the earthquake, but its principal office remained in the capital, Lima, for the first 18 months, and little effort was made to coordinate with local governments or to communicate with the public. And both the political will and the commitment of resources to carry out the reconstruction seemed to be missing. Some families given debit cards to procure construction materials found their accounts unfunded within a few months of the earthquake; some were still waiting for resources two years after the event.

The logical conclusion to draw from this comparison is that an institutional model taken from one context is difficult to import into another without a careful evaluation of its suitability and chances of success. Even a rapid institutional analysis would have predicted that the FOREC model was not a good fit for the social, economic, and political conditions of Peru in 2007.

1985 Mexico City Earthquake, Mexico

Creating a New Entity to Manage Urban Housing Reconstruction

The September 1985 Mexico City earthquake killed approximately 10,000 people and left some 250,000 homeless and another 900,000 with damaged homes. Reconstruction was declared by the president to be a project of national importance and a new agency, Renovación Habitacional Popular (RHP), was created to manage the challenge of housing reconstruction. This new agency was in charge of the clearance, reconstruction, and repair of more than 42,000 apartments, and oversaw the provision of temporary shelter to some 85,000 mostly low-income families. RHP started operations with staff borrowed from government ministries, many without previous planning or disaster experience. However, after the first chaotic weeks, its capacity grew and the project was successfully and rapidly completed. RHP’s tasks included everything from rebuilding damaged housing units (many of them in multi-family apartment buildings) to retrofitting housing at risk of damage from future earthquakes. The results of the program are impressive: reconstruction of 78,000 housing units, 48,000 of them during RHP’s original 2-year mandate; an expenditure of US$392 million; an improved tenure situation for those affected, accomplished by acquiring damaged substandard properties and reselling them to the residents; and a significant level of community participation in the project. The RHP experience shows that, in some situations, a new, dedicated agency is the best institutional solution. It also demonstrates that the success of an ambitious reconstruction program depends on the ready availability of adequate financial resources and a strategy that is well tailored to the requirements of the specific program.


2005 North Pakistan Earthquake

Formation of Government Agency to Address Disaster Reconstruction

After the North Pakistan earthquake in 2005 in which 75,000 people were killed and another 100,000 injured, the government of Pakistan created a new dedicated body to manage disaster recovery: the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA). ERRA was placed directly under the prime minister’s office and given a broad-ranging agenda: “to plan, coordinate, monitor, and regulate reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in earthquake affected areas, encouraging self reliance via private public partnership and community participation, [and] ensuring financial [transparency].” ERRA coordinated all national and international assistance agencies and facilitated the work of implementing partners, presenting it with the challenge of managing relationships with all the entities involved in the reconstruction: provincial and district authorities, the military, donor agencies, and the NGO community. Initially, ERRA’s rapid growth also presented transparency and accountability challenges, but, with time, an open system of reporting on resources and projects was developed and shared publicly from its own Web site. In general, ERRA is seen as a good example of effective management of all aspects of the reconstruction mandate it was given.

2003 Bam Earthquake, Iran

A Dedicated Task Force Drawn from Line Ministries Oversees Reconstruction
Immediately after the 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran, President Khatami, in consultation with his ministers and deputies, established a Steering Committee to plan and oversee reconstruction. A Provincial Reconstruction Focal Point Branch in Kerman Province (where Bam is located), under the supervision of the Steering Committee, was also established. The Steering Committee included the ministries of Housing and Urban Development, Finance, Interior, Judiciary, and Islamic Culture and Guidance; and heads of the Management and Programming Organization, the Cultural Heritage and Tourism Organization, the Iranian Red Crescent Society, the Kerman Housing Foundation (KHF), the Kerman Governorship, and Kerman provincial authorities. The Steering Committee was charged with establishing the basic reconstruction policies and was given significant autonomy: all decisions made by the Steering Committee had the same legal weight as those of the president and the cabinet. The Steering Committee established the Bam High Council of Architects and Planners, composed of five experts and skilled consultants. The council was asked to prepare guidelines for reconstruction. The Steering Committee also chose the then-president of the Housing Foundation of the Islamic Revolution (HF) as its secretary-general and designated the HF as the overall executing entity for construction, reconstruction, and retrofitting of the shelters and houses in Bam and in rural areas.


National Institute for Disaster Management, Mozambique
Integrating Disaster Management into Existing Institutional Structure
Floods and cyclones occur with some predictability in Mozambique. Since 2006, to manage the country’s response to these disasters, Mozambique has used a predesigned disaster recovery facility, the National Emergency Operation Center (Centro Nacional de Operações de Emergência [CENOJ]). During normal times, CENOJ gathers information, monitors weather, and conducts disaster research. If a disaster strikes, CENOJ and its branches act as physical and information nodes for coordination and decision making. The country’s principal disaster agency is the National Disasters Management Institute (Instituto Nacional de Gestão de Calamidades [INGC]) (created under a different name during the civil war that ended in 1992), which is located in the Ministry of State Administration (Ministério da Administração Estatal) and under a Coordinating Council of Disasters Management. After any disaster, CENOJ is activated to manage relief and recovery, with INGC acting as its secretariat. CENOJ’s operations are supported by a technical council composed of all the key sectors needed for disaster reconstruction. Thus, Mozambique’s approach to dealing with disasters is not to establish a specific body to manage reconstruction on a disaster-by-disaster basis, but rather to activate a well-planned system that works with existing line ministries, departments, and local governments in a highly devolved manner, with district governments playing a key reconstruction role, and to have disaster recovery undertaken by the same body that organizes the national disaster risk management program.


The Housing Foundation of the Islamic Revolution, Iran

Iran’s Housing Development Agency Also Responds to Disasters
The Housing Foundation of the Islamic Revolution (Bonyad Maskan or HF) was established in 1979 by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution. Since then, HF has grown to more than 100 branches throughout the country, with its main office located in Tehran. HF is government’s implementing arm in rural and urban housing for the poor and underprivileged members of the society. It also upgrades existing housing. In 2005, its annual goal was to construct or improve 200,000 rural housing units and 86,000 urban housing units. In addition to the direct implementation of social housing, the foundation is involved in the planning, evaluation, research, and provision of financial resources for housing development. Going beyond
its housing focus, HF provides technical and research support to rural development through the
renovation of historic villages, development of land use plans, and programs to expand land titling.

This permanent government agency also plays a critical role in disaster risk reduction and disaster
response. HF is government’s permanent disaster mitigation and post-disaster implementing agency,
and the leading agency for planning, designing, and directing post-disaster housing reconstruction.
In a post-disaster context, it works with agencies covering other sectors or issues, depending on
the particular situation. In normal times, it investigates vulnerabilities in construction practices
and promotes disaster-resistant construction. The HF’s reconstruction approach reflects the
accumulated technical knowledge of the agency and its staff, with more than a million housing units
constructed or reconstructed in the past 30 years. Its work increasingly incorporates goals such as
community participation, socio-cultural sensitivity, and emphasis on the environment.

Source: Housing Foundation of the Islamic Revolution, “Housing Foundation of the Islamic Revolution,” Fars Province Housing Foundation,

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